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VIT. Copyrights 
Introduction 
Michael Botein* 
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court had before it two 
cases which largely controlled the future of cable television. 
United States v. Southwestern Cable CO.I was a challenge to the 
Federal Communications Commission's newly asserted jurisdic-
tion over cable, while Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Televi-
sion, Inc.2 was an attempt to impose copyright liability on cable's 
use of broadcast television signals. To the infinite surprise of 
many communications lawyers, the Court found for the FCC on 
the issue of jurisdiction and rejected the contention that the cable 
industry would be subject to liability. The Court may have pre-
ferred regulation to litigation as a means of dealing ''lith the 
increasingly complicated problem of intermedia and intermodal 
competition, and assumed-quite justifiably-that new copy-
right legislation would follow hard on the heels of its decision. 
Even the cable industry conceded that some form of copy-
right payment was necessary as well as inevitable.3 But the cable, 
copyright, and broadcast interests could not agree on the more 
complex question of "how much." Under the baleful eyes of the 
FCC and the Office of Telecommunications Policy, they eventu-
ally negotiated the November, 1971 "concensus agreement."4 
This not only opened the way to the FCC's adoption of new cable 
television rules,!j but also committed the parties "to support sepa-
rate CATV copyright legislation ... ,and to seek its early pas-
sage."G The new negotiations settled nothing and charges of bad 
faith once again flew back and forth among the parties. 
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia Law School. B.A., 1980, Wdeyan Uni. 
versity; J.D., 1969, Cornell University; LL.M., 1972, Columbia Univereity. 
I 392 U.S. 157 (1968). 
2 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
• Resolution Adopted by the Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n Bd. of Directors, May 23, 
1969. Copy on file at the Brooklyn Law Review. 
• FCC Rules & Regs., 37 Fed. Reg. 3251, 3341 (1972) (rules relating to cable televi!:iQn 
service). 
5 ld. at 3277. These rules cover not only traditional problem areas of signal carriage, 
but also federaVstatelIocal relations, access to cable television, and technical standards. 
• ld. at 3341. 
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It was precisely this log-jam which the Second Circuit sought 
to break in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Teleprompter 
Corp.; In holding that a cable system infringes when using "dis-
tant" broadcast television signals, the court attempted to create 
a judicially mandated compromise. The main problem with the 
court's approach was, of course, the incredible vagueness of its 
holding. The difficult part of attaching copyright liability to dis-
tant signals is defining the term "distant." As the Second Circuit 
candidly noted, "it is easier to state what is not a distant signal."H 
Moreover, the court did not attempt to dovetail its definition of 
a distant signal with the FCC's multiple and complicated tests. o 
The Second Circuit probably did not intend to design an 
operable mechanism for settling copyright claims. There are, 
currently, approximately four thousand cable television systems 
in the United States, and most of them carry one or more distant 
signals. Any judicial resolution of the copyright problem would 
thus require adjudicating literally thousands of separate 
claims-a task which no court would wish upon the already 
overloaded federal judiciary. 
Realistically, the court may have viewed its decision as a 
plea to the Congress and a goad to the parties. Thus, its opinion 
ended by noting that "[ w]e hope that the Congress will in due 
course legislate a fuller and more flexible accommodation of com-
peting copyright, anti-trust, and communications policy consid-
erations .... "111 The decision's sheer vagueness may have been 
an effective-albeit extra-judicial-tactic for encouraging mean-
ingful negotiations; the more uncertain their positions, the more 
willing the parties may be to compromise. The Second Circuit 
attempted to throw a significant wild card into the copyright 
deck. Whether the court would have succeeded when so many 
others failed, must remain an unanswered question,lI 
7 476 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1973). 
• [d. at 351. 
• Thus, the FCC requires carriage of a signal where, inter alia, a station places a 
Grade B contour over a cable system's community, the station is within thirty.five miles 
of the cable system's community, the station is "signifi~antly viewed," or where thl.' 
station operates in the same television market. FCC Telecommun. Regs., 47 C.F.H. 
§§ 76.m(a) .. 59(a), .61(a) (1972). 
'" Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Telprompter Corp., 476 F.2d at 354. 
" The Supreme Court, in reversing the Second Circuit, held that the importatioll of 
distant signals did not constitute copyright infringement. Teleprompter Corp. v. Colum. 
bia Broadcasting System, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 1129, 1138 (1974). 
